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Regional Responses to Transnational Migration in North and Central America1 
By Stefanie Kron, Freie Universität Berlin 
Abstract: This paper analyses the manifestations of and contestations to the 
migration management paradigm in North and Central America. I pay special 
attention to the understudied Central American Isthmus countries. I argue that 
migration management is not only an important response to increasing transnational 
migration but it also shapes the institutional arrangements of a new regional mobility 
regime. This regime is characterised by multilateralisation and tends to establish new 
forms of social control on mobile populations. Informed by studies of neoliberal 
governmentality and international government, recent research has criticised the 
concept of migration management as marked by a depoliticising language that tends 
to ‘teach’ technocratic western standards of migration governance to the countries 
and former ‘imperial subjects’ of the global South. Somewhat neglected in this recent 
wave of critical research, however, has been the interest expressed by the countries 
of the global South in adopting this migration management paradigm. I argue that 
Costa Rica is an appropriate case to demonstrate such interests. A second omission 
in recent research is a failure to reveal contestations to migration management 
discourses and practices. I claim that it is predominantly the strategies of ‘escape’ of 
migrants and local border societies that challenge migration management and force 
its actors to adopt flexible strategies of control. I draw on the multi-level and multi-
actor framework of ethnographic regime analysis in order to analyse both the 
institutional arrangements of migration management and the actors, practices and 
strategies of what I call the ‘power of migration’. In doing so I focus empirically on the 
Regional Conference on Migration in North and Central America (RCM), the new 
migration law in Costa Rica as well as the dynamics at the Costa Rican northern 
border region. I show that migration management can be analysed as part of broader 
social and state transformation processes of the Central American countries and is 
therefore a contested field.  
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades cross-border migration has become an increasingly 
important field of political intervention. This not only counts for the metropolitan 
states like the United States and the countries of the European Union but also for the 
countries of the global South. Furthermore, policy responses to transnational 
migration are becoming more and more regionalised and multilateral in character 
thus converting intergovernmental agencies such as the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) into important new actors. Within this context, the idea of 
international migration management constitutes an increasingly dominant framework 
of discourses and practices claiming to ‘optimise’ the impact of international 
migration by creating a new global regime of rules and norms for the governance of 
cross-border mobility. These claims are linked to a paradigm shift in the notion of 
migration and border control: from stopping or coercing people and closing borders, 
to ‘ordering’ migration movements, steering people, and governing the permeability 
of borders (see also Geiger and Pécoud 2010).  
One of the first regional and multilateral migration management initiatives that 
emerged was the Regional Conference on Migration in North and Central America 
(RCM) founded in 1996 in Mexico. Coordinated by the IOM, all governments from 
Canada to Panama have since joined the RCM. The Conference aims to deal 
comprehensively with increasing cross-border migration throughout the North and 
Central American region, including movements heading from or through the Central 
American Isthmus to the north as well as those circulating within the Isthmus sub-
region (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2001, Hansen 2010).2  
Compared to Europe, however, very little independent academic attention has been 
focused on migration as a field of transnational political intervention.3 Most research 
on current migration policies and border control in North and Central America 
maintains a “methodological nationalism” (Schiller and Wimmer 2003), tending to 
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limit analysis to national or bi-national actors and policies within the economic-
political space of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4  
Central America, in contrast, can be considered a blind spot regarding research on 
regionalisation and multilateralisation of migration policies. Indeed, authors like Juan 
Manuel Sandoval (2005) have had to overcome nationally defined conceptions of 
mobility control in order to portray the U.S. as attempting to integrate Mexico into its 
migration policy as a ‘borderland’ (país frontera). In doing so, according to Sandoval, 
the U.S. seek to externalise immigration and border control to the countries south of 
Rio Bravo (see also Castillo 2003). However, the concept of externalisation of border 
control rarely encompasses Central American countries within methodological 
reflections or empirical research on U.S. migration policy. 
Furthermore, North American research on migration policies and border control 
stresses the image of ‘Fortress America’, constructing the U.S. as a kind of neo-
imperial regional ruler that resists immigration, especially its irregular forms, with 
harsh anti-immigration laws, border militarisation and coercive measures. According 
to Andrijasevic and Walters (2010: 984) the U.S. uses a “combination of economic, 
political, financial, and even military inducement to win the active participation of 
countries like […] Mexico in their migration control strategies”. 
I argue that in order to understand the modes and logics of international migration 
management and its regional as well as national and local manifestations, 
intergovernmental organisations and the Central American countries need to be 
more systematically included into a real transnational framework of analysis. With 
regard to regional fora such as the RCM, I claim that the Central American countries 
are not only objects of coercion or inducement, but also actors who stress national 
interests. Furthermore, since border control constitutes the major concern of 
migration management initiatives, the extremely permeable Central American 
borders provide an important area for empirical research (see Kron 2010). 
Within this context special attention should be paid to Costa Rica, which holds an 
ambiguous position in the region: in contrast to the other Central American countries 
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Costa Rica exhibits a solid economy and a strong welfare state tradition. It is 
therefore the most powerful national actor in Central America. However, the country 
currently suffers from rising social conflicts and inequalities caused by the cutback of 
domestic public welfare policies, as well as by the economic and political crisis in the 
impoverished neighboring country of Nicaragua. This has resulted in an increasing 
number of Nicaraguan immigrants in Costa Rica. In addition, Costa Rica exhibits 
quite significant movements of emigration and transit migration to North America 
(Caamaño 2010, Jiménez 2009, Morales 2007, Rocha 2004, and Sandoval 2007).  
Another claim of this paper concerns the place of control in migration management. 
While knowledge production on migration management has long been part of the 
research carried out on behalf of intergovernmental organisations, only recently has 
a more critical approach been pursued. This research route  is informed by studies of 
neoliberal governmentality (Foucault 2007 and 2008) and international government 
(Dean 2007 and Duffield 2001).5  
Scholars exploring this avenue draw on the conceptualisation of power, control and 
government provided by Michel Foucault’s definition of neoliberal governmentality. 
They do so in order to cover analytically the fact that migration management is less 
about stopping migration and closing borders and more about governing spaces, 
movements and bodies. According to Foucault, the term governmentality denotes an 
idea of government that is not limited to state politics alone, but includes a wide 
range of control techniques. It is applied to a wide variety of objects, from one's 
control of the self to the biopolitical control of populations. Furthermore, the concept 
of governmentality defines power not only in terms of the hierarchical, top-down 
power of the state, but also includes forms of social control through disciplinary 
institutions and forms of knowledge. The term neoliberal governmentality in turn 
names a type of governmentality that characterises advanced liberal democracies. 
Here, the notion of governmentality refers to societies where power is de-centered, 
with citizens playing an active role in their own self-government (Burchell et al. 
1991). Migration management thus emerges as a kind of social control for mobile 
populations (see also Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 17).  
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Furthermore, critical scholars question migration management as marked by a 
technical and depoliticising language, thus hiding the social and political conflicts that 
characterise the migration field as well as the power asymmetries between and 
within countries that participate in migration management programmes. Andrijasevic 
and Walters, for instance, point out that migration management is dominated by 
intergovernmental organisations like the IOM that aim to ‘teach’ technocratic 
Western standards to the countries and subjects of the global South . According to 
these authors the main goal of migration management is the alignment of migration 
policies in regions such as West Africa or Latin America “with the migration control 
norms and aspirations of the global North. In shaping the migration control strategies 
of these ‘third countries’ and regions, IOM concerns itself with the difficult task of 
sorting mobile populations into streams of useful and useless” (Andrijasevic and 
Walters 2010: 982). However Andrijasevic and Walters do not analyse this encounter 
in the “global borderlands” (Duffield 2001) as neo imperialism or “classical 
imperialism” (Düvell 2003), but rather as a sort of post imperial international 
government that “takes the form of a regulated choice not an imposition” while it is 
“patterned as a situation in which IOM methods and norms are not imposed but 
‘learnt’” by the states of the global South. Hence, the latter appear as ‘active’ but 
‘learning’ partners (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010: 984).  
I agree that for the case of North and Central America studies on governmentality 
and international government provide an appropriate framework for a multi-level and 
multi-actor analysis of migration management as a neoliberal and post-imperial 
mode of mobility control. Nevertheless, contestations to the supposed predominance 
of migration management discourses and practices have been somewhat neglected 
in this recent wave of critical research. I argue that the dynamics of local border 
societies and mobile populations’ own strategies of ‘escape’ from control form the 
main challenge to the power technologies of migration and border management. 
However, since governmentality studies limit their analysis to structures and 
institutions, they cannot effectively capture these escape dynamics and strategies. 
Thus, their limitations can be found in the fact that “subjectivities are not formed by 
hegemonic invocation alone”, but “also emerge within the practices of escape from 
hegemonialised modes of subjectification” (Hess and Tsianos 2010: 248f). 
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Based on these conceptual considerations, I claim that the migration field in North 
and Central America is constituted and constantly renegotiated by the dynamics 
between migration movements and institutionalised attempts to fix, steer, and govern 
them. Drawing on a dynamic regime concept (Sciortino 2004), I conceptualise this 
field of conflict and renegotiation as ‘migration regime’. Borders are a particular 
important and conflictual site of migration regimes. Thus, border regimes form proper 
regimes within migration regimes or what in a broader sense can be called mobility 
regimes. In order to cover these negotiating practices, a group of European scholars 
conceived of an “ethnographic analysis of border regimes” (Hess et al. 2009). 
Ethnographic regime analysis focuses on the institutional arrangements of a given 
regime as well as on the actors and practices that contest them. Drawing from the 
literature on Italian and French post-operaism, migrants’ “lived forms of dissidence 
and the practices of rupture” with “neoliberal governmental rationalities, power 
technologies, and modes of subjectification” (Hess and Tsianos 2010: 248) are 
conceptualised as autonomy of migration. Thus, this literature defines migration as a 
political and social movement “that […] follows its own rules, and collectively 
organises its own praxis” (Moulier-Boutang 2007, cited in Hess et al 2009: 3). 
According to Yann Moulier-Boutang (2004: 1) autonomy of migration “stands for a 
priority of movement of the people vis-à-vis movements of capital, regulation of the 
States, and static or structural points of view”.6  
Even though I agree with attempts to reconceptualise migration as an important 
societal power and not as a societal exception, the concept of autonomy of migration 
also implies a normative claim I do not share: that is the equation of migration with 
resistance to capitalism and state regulation, which naturalises migrants’ 
subjectivities as dissident ones. I argue, in contrast, that migrants and mobile 
populations are not a priori political subjects, but rather their practices of escape in 
order to realise the migration project or to maintain cross-border mobility constitute a 
societal power that produces ungoverned places, movements and bodies within a 
migration regime, thus challenging the regime’s institutional arrangements to adopt 
flexible strategies of control.  
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Replacing ‘autonomy of migration’ with ‘power of migration’ I use the methodological 
framework of ethnographic regime analysis to explore the dynamics between 
migration management activities and the power of migration in North and Central 
America, with particular attention to the understudied Central American countries. I 
ask the following questions: How does the global migration management paradigm 
materialise on the regional, national and local levels? Which proper interests do the 
Central American countries track in adopting the migration management paradigm? 
And how is migration management being challenged? 
After a brief overview of the main characteristics of migration management, I explore 
how the regional migration management initiative – the RCM – shapes new 
discourses, narratives, and practices on migration and border control in North and 
Central America. Taking Costa Rica as case study I then show how both North 
American and national Costa Rican interests in migration management merge 
together. I argue that migration and border management serve to control migration 
from, through and into Costa Rica. Moreover, they form part of new modes of 
domestic government that tend to ‘manage’ increasing social inequalities and 
conflicts through security-focused policies. The concluding section of the paper 
analyses how the mobile populations and their cross-border activities challenge the 
migration and border management paradigm at the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan frontier. 
To do so, I draw on findings of ethnographic field work carried out in Costa Rica in 
2010.  
Migration management: A success story? 
Following requests from the United Nations Commission on Global Governance, the 
notion of migration management was first elaborated in 1993 by Bimal Ghosh. 
Overall, the idea of migration management was that in the post-Cold War era, 
migration had the potential to generate real crisis. Thus, a holistic global regime of 
rules and norms was needed to successfully address this phenomenon and turn 
international migration into a more orderly, manageable and predictable process. 
This implied both a regulated openness toward beneficial flows and the continuation 
of restrictions regarding unwanted migration. Consequently, Ghosh proposed a 
three-pillar model meant first to harmonise the politics and interests of all states 
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concerned with migration, and second to create a new international framework 
agreement on global mobility. Third, it should strengthen the role of non-government 
actors that were to become more influential in migration policy-making (Geiger and 
Pécoud 2010: 2f, Ghosh 2000).  
Since then a wide range of different non-state actors such as UN-organisations, 
global and regional discussion fora, the World Bank and NGOs have achieved 
increasing influence on migration management. However, the most important actors 
aside from governments are the IOM and the Regional Consultative Processes on 
Migration. During the 1990s, the IOM became the world’s most important 
intergovernmental organisation regarding both the production of discourses on what 
international migration is all about and the development of ‘best practices’ on how it 
should be ‘managed’ by policy makers. The main categories of thought and action 
can be summarised as ‘migration and security’, ‘migration and development’, 
‘migration and labour markets’, ‘readmission and return programmes’, and ‘border 
management’ as a cross-cutting concern. 
Furthermore, the IOM and its migration management strategy, which is based on 
Ghosh’s three-pillar model, form part of a new type of international government 
characterised by the externalisation of policy making to private agencies. In contrast 
to the well defined and democratically legitimised mandate of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the IOM is a membership organisation 
situated outside the United Nations system without a clear mandate. Nevertheless, 
the IOM is playing an increasingly influential role in shaping governments’ decisions, 
for example by producing knowledge, providing scientific or technical expertises to 
states, and developing programmes on behalf of governments or directly 
implementing policies. The IOM, therefore, can better be described as a 
transnational private company that provides migration services to governments. This 
character is also evident in the budgeting. The IOM receives little regular funding and 
hence depends upon extra-budgetary projects that are, in most cases, funded by 
metropolitan migrant-receiving states, particularly the U.S. The main characteristic of 
the migration management paradigm is its multi-level and multi-actor nature: 
intergovernmental actors like the IOM cannot implement their programmes without 
the cooperation of domestic actors. Thus, since the mid-1990s the most important 
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activity of the IOM has consisted of the creation and coordination of at least 15 so-
called Regional Consultative Processes on Migration (RCPs) all over the world  (see 
Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 3ff, Georgi 2010). RCPs are informal fora of governmental 
and non-governmental actors. Their objective is to discuss migration related topics 
on the regional and multilateral levels and to create new alliances between sending, 
receiving and transit countries. Even though RCP agreements are non-binding, the 
IOM sees them as the most important regional actors in the area of “managing intra-
regional migration” and as a key instrument on the way to the establishment of a new 
international migration regime (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2001: 51, see also Hansen 
2010, Thouez and Channac 2005).7  
According to Andrijasevic and Walters, RCPs constitute crucial arenas where the 
power asymmetries between the respective RCP member states are reconciled, 
while reframing the unequal relations between metropolitan states and migrant-
sending and/or transit countries of the global South as dialogues, partnerships and 
cooperation. Within this context the techniques corresponding to the migration 
management paradigm such as ‘capacity-building’, ‘information campaigns’ and 
‘action plans’ contribute to the construction of the migrants-sending or transit 
countries as ‘deficient’ but ‘learning partners’. RCPs hence are networks where the 
IOM “can align its activities with larger projects of regional governmentality, 
development and aid” (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010: 990).  
Governing the global South through managing irregular migration and borders  
This is especially the case with regard to the management of irregular migration and 
borders. Even though the notion of migration management is supposed to cover all 
types of human mobility, these two topics have become the central focus of the 
IOM’s and RCPs’ activities. Associated herewith are certain discourses, narratives 
and practices that target above all migrant-sending and/or transit countries.  
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Irregular migration can be considered a complex phenomenon. First of all its 
definition depends on immigration and border policies that vary from state to state 
and over time. Secondly, a wide range of different actors is involved in the 
organisation of irregular migration: migrants themselves, but also transporters, 
traders, landlords, employers and others. There is also a wide range of policy 
options to deal with irregular migration, for instance the regularisation of irregular 
migrants in migrant-receiving countries. However, these options are hardly 
addressed by the IOM and RCPs. Rather, the IOM’s main activities vis-à-vis irregular 
migration were initially concentrated on knowledge production and analysis of what 
since then has become known as ‘human smuggling and trafficking’. For instance, 
so-called country profiles of sending and transit regions regarding the routes and 
networks of irregular migration were elaborated, and existing legal options to punish 
smuggling and trafficking were analysed.  
As of the mid 1990s onwards and mainly based on its own expertise, the IOM has 
been emphasizing the global need to privilege the fight against human smuggling 
and trafficking and the development of new legislative models that would enable the 
penalisation of these phenomena and the protection of their victims. In 2000 the 
United Nations, for instance, adopted two protocols on smuggling and trafficking 
which complement the Convention on Transnational Crime: the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, and 
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. These 
documents define and differentiate human smuggling and trafficking as follows: 
“‘Smuggling of migrants’ shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, from the illegal entry of a person into a 
State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident“ (UN 
Convention Transnational Crime, Smuggling, Annex III, 2000: art. 3, p. 2). 
 
“‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms 
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a 
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose 
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of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UN 
Convention Transnational Crime, Trafficking, Annex II, 2000: art. 3, p. 2). 
 
These legal models are communicated to the IOMs’ partner states in the global 
South through the RCPs and by using techniques such as capacity-building 
activities, action plans, information campaigns and legal consulting. This helped to 
create a common language marked by a strong link between irregular migration and 
organised crime. The special importance of RCPs in consensus building and policy 
development regarding the migration-security nexus is stated in several IOM reports. 
A record published in 2001, for instance, concludes that “in face of the increase in 
smuggling and trafficking – regional consultative processes can […] assist in the 
management of extra-regional migration” (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2001: 51), 
while a recent evaluation of RCPs states that “criminalization of trafficking is now 
common practice” and that “[m]ultiple RCPs are dealing with people smuggling and 
human trafficking and have induced participating states to adopt policies on this 
matter” (Hansen 2010: 28f).  
Thus, managing irregular migration has now become a by-word for combating 
human smuggling and trafficking. Geiger and Pécoud even suppose that “many 
measures to stop unauthorised migration” such as stricter visa requirements and 
border controls are “presented as ‘necessary’ to fight human smuggling and 
trafficking” (Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 13). Sabine Hess and Vassilis Tsianos refer to 
this reformulation of irregular migration in terms of organised crime as “Anti-
Trafficking discourse” (Hess and Tsianos 2007: 29). But this discourse is not only a 
criminalising discourse that constructs the human smuggler or trafficker as an extra-
legal actor of violence who is a threat to public security. At the same time it is a 
victimising discourse that presents irregular migrants solely as (potential) smuggling 
or trafficking victims whose human rights need to be protected by counter-trafficking 
efforts. However, the Anti-Trafficking discourse not only reduces the most diverse 
actors involved in the organisation of irregular migration to a pair of discursive 
figures: the delinquent and victim (ibid.). In addition, it blurs the important differences 
between human smuggling (service provision in the area of facilitating irregular 
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migration) and trafficking (trading in human beings aimed at their sexual or labour 
exploitation) defined by the Palermo Protocols. It is also worth mentioning that this 
“victimhood approach” to irregular migration has replaced any kind of binding 
commitments to safeguard migrants’ rights. Migration management initiatives such 
as RCPs indeed have not produced a single binding commitment from member 
states in the field of human or migrants’ rights (see Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 13).8   
Closely related to the management of irregular migration is the idea of border 
management. As Andrijasevic and Walters point out, the migration management 
paradigm conceptualises borders as “problem” zones of government and control 
(Andrijasevic and Walters 2010: 986). Thus, according to the IOM, well-managed 
borders would assure the efficiency of all migration management programmes: “The 
border management system is the key control mechanism for overall migration 
management. [It] must both ‘facilitate bona fide travellers, providing a welcoming and 
efficient gateway to the state’ and also ‘provide a barrier and disincentive to entry for 
those seeking to circumvent migration laws’ […]”.9  
Migration management in North and Central America: the Puebla Process 
The emergence of migration management in North and Central America can be seen 
as part of broader transformation processes in the Isthmus region. These processes 
started with the cessation of armed conflicts in Nicaragua (1990), El Salvador (1992), 
and Guatemala (1996). One important axis is the so-called economic integration of 
the Free Trade Agreements between the Central American states and the U.S. 
Robinson refers to these processes as the peripheral integration of the Isthmus 
countries into the global economy (2003: 64f). Within this context the migration of 
labour from the Isthmus countries to the U.S. has been significantly increased, 
though migration ‘al Norte’ had already started to increase in the late 1970s when 
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala were characterised by internal armed 
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conflicts and civil wars. Thus, the number of Central American migrants in the U.S., 
especially from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, tripled between 
1980 and 1990, doubled again up to the year 2000 and continued to increase rapidly 
in the 2000s.10  
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. has reacted to this phenomenon by adopting stricter 
immigration requirements, laws and border control mechanisms (Dunn 1996, 
Sandoval 2005). These nationally defined policy measures did not lead, however, to 
the decrease of immigration but to the illegalisation of the major part of immigration 
from the Isthmus: in 2003 around 2.2 million persons from Central America were 
registered in the U.S. (GCIM 2005: 5). According to estimates, however, between 
four and five million people from the Isthmus region reside in the U.S., the majority 
having no legal residence status.11  
Mexico is indeed the most important transit country for irregular migration 
movements heading north. Since the 1990s, however, Central America has become 
an increasingly attractive transit space, not only for Central Americans themselves 
but also for migrants from South America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. The 
reasons for this are the stricter immigration and border control policies of the North 
American countries and also, up to the late 1990s, the lack of coherent immigration 
policies and visa rules in the Central American nations. Furthermore, the land 
borders of the Isthmus states were barely controlled and thus more or less open to 
be crossed.  
In addition, Costa Rica has become an important destination for the so-called South-
South migration, especially from Nicaragua and more recently also from Colombia 
(Rocha 2004 and 2006). In 1984, at the height of Nicaragua’s civil war, less than 
90,000 foreigners were living in Costa Rica and less than 46,000 of them were 
Nicaraguan citizens. In 2000, the Nicaraguan population in Costa Rica had grown 
nearly five-fold to more than 226,000. Nicaraguan citizens now comprise 76 % of the 
immigrant population in Costa Rica, not including the thousands of undocumented 
                                                          
10
 At the same time the registered migrants’ monetary remittances significantly increased. In 2007 for 
instance they amounted up to between 10% (Guatemala) and more than 25 % (Honduras) of gross 
domestic product (GDP) (see World Bank 2008: 116, 121).  
11
 See e.g. U.S. Census (2002), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet (11/01/11).   
14 
 
Nicaraguans who are both permanent and temporary residents in the country (Lee 
2010: 11f).12  
It was against this backdrop of increasing cross-border migration and the widely 
unsuccessful national attempts of the North American countries to restrict 
immigration that, in 1996, the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM), better 
known as the Puebla Process, was established in Mexico in order to address cross-
border migration as a regional issue. It was one of the first RCPs to be created and it 
is considered, according to several IOM publications, as one of the most 
consolidated and ‘successful’ with regard to its outcomes.13  
The RCM is mainly funded by the U.S. and Canada. The other member states with 
voting rights are Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic. Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, 
Jamaica and Peru participate as observers. The regional OIM office for Mexico and 
Central America, located in San José, Costa Rica, administers the funding and 
coordinates activities. A wide range of further intergovernmental organisations also 
cooperates with the RCM, including for instance the UNHCR, the United Nations 
Development Fund (UNDP), the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA). Regional organisations such as the Central American Commission 
of Migration Directors (OCAM) and the Central American Integration System (SICA) 
are represented as observers together with a network of regional and national 
NGOs. A special institution called the Regional Network against Smuggling and 
Trafficking completes this organisational diagram. The RCM holds annual meetings 
that are only open for the deputy home and foreign secretaries of the member states. 
The representatives of the observer states and cooperating organisations have 
access to special events, workshops and seminars. The presidency (presidency Pro-
Témpore) rotates between the member states (http://www.rcmvs.org; 15/01/11). 
The Puebla Process articulated a then widely accepted conceptualisation of cross-
border migration as a proper and increasingly important policy field that had to be 
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dealt with on the regional and multilateral levels. The first declaration published after 
the initial meeting in 1996, defined migration both as a phenomenon that potentially 
benefited the countries of origin and destination and at the same as a potential 
security and development problem that could negatively affect North and Central 
America alike. Thus, according to the declaration, migration had to be “ordered” 
through regionally coordinated interventions (Comunicado Conjunto, I Conferencia 
Regional sobre Migración, Puebla, 1996, p. 1 and 3). The declaration also contains 
twenty basic agreements. The first stresses the need to promote the development 
and adoption of an “integral, objective and long-term focus on the migration 
phenomenon which covers both its reasons and manifestations” (ibid. p. 1). 
However, even more explicit than in the case of other RCPs, “the Puebla Process 
was initiated with the firm intention of reducing irregular migration in the North and 
Central American region” (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2001: 34). Thus, the majority of 
subsequent agreements identified quite concrete measures to reduce irregular 
migration and to combat human trafficking and smuggling.14 
The Director of the regional IOM office in San José attended the first Puebla Process 
meeting in Mexico and recounts how and why irregular migration and counter-
trafficking efforts became the most important topics. According to the Director the 
representatives of the U.S. arrived at the Puebla meeting with the clear intention of 
reducing irregular immigration by externalizing border control policies to Mexico and 
the Isthmus countries. The Mexican delegation, in contrast, was above all concerned 
with the poor treatment of their co-nationals by U.S. authorities, while the Central 
American delegations were disappointed with how Mexico treated transit migrants 
from the Isthmus countries. Within this conflict-ridden and polarised situation, human 
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 These include information and data exchange between the member states (agreement 14), legal 
reforms that facilitate the penalisation of migrants’ smuggling (15), public information campaigns on 
human smuggling (16), extended regional cooperation in terms of technical assistance and capacity-
building in order to perfect the national systems of investigation, management of proofs and criminal 
proceeding of migrants’ smugglers (17), promotion of information exchange and regional cooperation 
aiming at technical assistance and capacity-building of human resources in order to control flows of 
undocumented extra regional migrants (20), and the development of measures in order to combat the 
falsification of travel documents. Only two and hardly concretised agreements refer to the facilitation 
of documented migration (13) and labor migration (10). Further two agreements address the need of 
social and economic development in sending countries (3 and 4). There can also be found three 
paragraphs naming basic rights of irregular migrants (5, 6 and 7) as well as one agreement 
concerning the need to harmonise migration laws and policies throughout the region (12) 
(Comunicado Conjunto, I Conferencia Regional sobre Migración, Puebla, 1996, p. 1 – 3). 
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smuggling and trafficking served, as the following quotation shows, as an easy topic 
with which to start the meeting:  
“[The delegations] agreed that something had to be done, not so much at the U.S.-
Mexican border but rather in the south … encouraging the capacity of the region’s 
governments to face a problem that affects all countries in the region and all of us 
[…]. Everybody could agree with respect to this phenomenon – trafficking – nobody 
is against the idea that this is something bad […]. Not a single state would say: ‘I am 
helping trafficking’  […] ‘I am involved in smuggling’ […]. And they [(irregular 
migrants)] are all from other continents, so they [(the delegations)] could agree that 
something had to be done in order to investigate an arrival which is not normal […], 
and that Central America is being instrumentalised to achieve another thing [: 
reaching the U.S.]. The Central Americans did not want this, the Mexicans did not 
want this, the U.S. and Canada did not want this. Hence, […] something …. easy 
[was discussed], smuggling and extra-continentals, somebody from outside … And 
after discussing these easy topics they came to other more difficult ones” (interview 
with the Director of the regional IOM office, San José, 15/06/10).  
Hence, the Anti-Trafficking discourse can be seen as the Puebla Process’s founding 
narrative while presenting irregular migration as a common and extra-regional 
security threat to all North and Central America countries. Thus, it created 
consensus and legitimised further multilateral cooperation by embracing the Isthmus 
countries as supposed equal partners. The Anti-Trafficking discourse, therefore, 
could both reconcile the different interests and power asymmetries between the 
member states and justify prospective interventions in Central America. 
The first step toward the consolidation of the Puebla Process was the development 
of an action plan, which was adopted at the second annual meeting in 1997 in 
Panama.  According to Andrijasevic and Walters, the action plan is a “key technique” 
of migration management “through which governments become constructed as 
agents bearing ethical responsibility and calculability for reforming particular policy 
domains”. Furthermore it serves as an instrument of international government that 
“configures a new kind of relationship between governments, [and] the international 
community” (2010: 991).  
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In the Puebla Process’s action plan scheme the term migration management (in 
Spanish: gestión migratoria) appeared for the first time as a comprehensive 
framework for migration related activities. The IOM played and continues to play a 
crucial role with regard to the action plan. It produces knowledge and analysis, 
coordinates activities and organises workshops for government representatives (see 
Historical Plan of Action, Regional Conference on Migration, 1997).  
An IOM report on combating irregular migration and smuggling of migrants, for 
instance, served as a sort of expert report, providing guidance for the action plan. 
This document, in contrast to the Puebla Process’s founding narrative, not only 
named extra regional irregular migration, but also irregular migration from the 
Isthmus countries themselves as a common threat. Furthermore, Central America 
was now presented as a largely ungoverned space of unauthorised and uncontrolled 
movements. Thus, the ‘need’ for intervention in this sub-region was reaffirmed:   
“Central America […] serves increasingly as a corridor for the irregular movement of 
persons. Significant numbers of nationals of the Central American countries 
contribute to the streams of irregular migrants to the north. Furthermore the Central 
American […] territories are increasingly used as a transit zone for migrants from 
outside the region. This increase of irregular movements and smuggling of migrants 
has caused an increasing […] understanding that these practices could constitute a 
threat to national security. The governments increasingly perceive the need for 
solutions.” (IOM 1997: 2) 
As a result counter trafficking efforts, as well as other measures to reduce irregular 
migration, occupy the most significant portion of the action plan: seven of twelve 
objectives focus on the reduction of irregular migration and the eradication of human 
smuggling and trafficking. These include the encouragement of regional cooperation, 
data exchange and public information campaigns, the securitisation and ‘ordering’ of 
borders, the development of return programmes for irregular migrants, and technical 
cooperation in order to modernise information, control and security systems. Further, 
important objectives constitute regional harmonisation of migration legislation, 
technical cooperation in capacity-building for civil servants involved in migration 
related issues, and promotion of cooperation with intergovernmental organisations 
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and NGOs. Topics such as migration and development and migrants rights, while 
incorporated within  the 1996 declaration, did not find their way into the action plan 
scheme (see Historical Plan of Action, Regional Conference on Migration, 1997).15   
In 2002, the IOM published another report on the Isthmus countries entitled, “The 
State of Migration Management in Central America”. This document presented 
migration management as a constitutive part of state transformation and 
development in the Isthmus sub-region, thus reaffirming the role of the Central 
American countries as main targets and ‘learning’ partners of migration management 
activities (IOM 2002: 6). In addition the selection of “essential aspects” clearly 
identified the Central American borders, the border regions’ populations and their 
border related activities as the main problem for efficient migration and border 
management in the region:  
“Exclusion to which Central American migrants are subject [...] encourages the 
growth of clandestine migrations and trafficking of people [...] Geographical 
conditions that facilitate crossing the borders through places not authorized for the 
international movement of passengers favour the entry and transit of undocumented 
migrants […] assisted by organizations involved in trafficking, by local inhabitants, 
and at times without any help at all. Other contributing factors are the limitations 
imposed by Migration Agencies, and the lack of personnel, communication and 
transportation means [...] to effectively perform their duties […]. While there are 
organizations devoted to the trafficking of people, some inhabitants of the border-
town play a significant role in keeping this illegal activity going. Because they know 
the area so well, these persons help undocumented migrants to cross the border by 
going through so-called ‘blind spots’” (IOM 2002: 10 and 17). 
Even though social exclusion is named as a factor of irregular migration, the report 
ends up criminalising irregular border-crossings as well as border town dwellers, and 
proposing solely technical or punitive solutions. These include, for instance, the 
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 The action plan scheme was reworked in 2009. The new version includes, beside migration 
management still focussing on irregular migration and borders, two new categories of intervention: 
human rights and development. The human rights area, however, emphasises the supposed victims 
of smuggling and trafficking, defining women and children as particularly vulnerable groups (Plan of 
Action, Regional Conference on Migration, 2009).  
 
19 
 
reinforcement of inland inspection posts away from the main border posts (pre-
frontier control strategies), or the inclusion of anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking 
paragraphs into national laws in countries still lacking legislations on the topic (ibid. 
17 and 22). The recommendations, however, not only aim to control and punish 
irregular migration and their facilitating networks, but also to optimise the “speed” of 
border-crossing procedures for tourists or truckers (ibid. 23). Thus, the IOM 
constitutes the Central American borders as zones “of experimentation and 
innovation in technologies of government” (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010: 986). 
To date, all IOM reports on RCPs believe that the Puebla Process has achieved a 
great deal with regard to the prevention of irregular migration through regional 
cooperation, increased border controls and tighter regulations. The current report, for 
instance, states that the Puebla Process has been most successful regarding 
migration policy achievements in the area of human smuggling and trafficking 
(Hansen 2010: 27f). Indeed, between its creation in 1996 and 2007, all member 
states have adopted penal and/or migration law reforms in order to include human 
smuggling and trafficking as criminal activities and to protect their victims.  
With regard to the North American countries, Canada reformed its migration 
legislation in 2002 to include the legal concept of human smuggling, and in 2005 Law 
C-49 defined human trafficking as a crime and incorporated it into the Canadian 
penal code. The U.S. adopted a proper law to protect the victims of human trafficking 
and violence in 2000. The Immigration and Nationalization Act was reformed in 1996 
and again in 2005 providing since then criminal penalties for “acts or attempts to 
bring unauthorized aliens to or into the United States, transport them within the U.S., 
harbour unlawful aliens, encourage entry of illegal aliens, or conspire to commit 
these violations, knowingly or in reckless disregard of illegal status”. Mexico’s federal 
penal law contains several paragraphs regarding the criminalisation and penalisation 
of human trafficking (201, 203, 205 and 366) and the general population law covers 
criminal offences related to the facilitation of irregular migration. However, it has not 
been possible to determine when these paragraphs were created and adopted.16  
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 http://www.rcmvs.org/documentos/investigacion/pagina_matrices.htm (13/01/11).  
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With respect to Central America, Costa Rica’s penal law was reformed in 1999 to 
include a law against the sexual exploitation of minors (No. 7899) and again in 2009 
to include the criminal offence of human trafficking. In El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras a counter-trafficking decree reformed the penal laws in 2003 (El Salvador, 
No. 210) and in 2005 (Guatemala, No. 14-2005; Honduras No. 234-2005). Since 
2004 Panama has had a law to prevent and typify crimes against integrity and sexual 
liberty. Furthermore this law modifies specific paragraphs of the penal law.17 (see 
RCM 2007: 50). While El Salvador, Honduras and Panama included the offence of 
smuggling in the reforms of the their penal codes, Costa Rica and Guatemala 
attached legal precepts to punish smuggling to their migration legislation, reformed in 
2006 and 2010 (Costa Rica) and 1998 (Guatemala). Nicaragua had already adopted 
a proper law against smuggling in 1996 but by 2007 was still discussing a proposed 
law to define and punish trafficking. Furthermore the fact of irregular migration itself 
is criminalised through certain paragraphs in the immigration or population laws of 
the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Nicaragua, while almost all 
Central American countries have introduced or tightened visa rules.18  
Adopting and challenging migration management in Costa Rica 
The Puebla Process can be interpreted as the crucial institutional arrangement of an 
emergent and comprehensive regional migration regime in North and Central 
America. This regime is characterized both by multilateralisation efforts and the 
criminalization of undocumented cross-border mobility. The following close analysis 
of the new Costa Rican migration law as well as of the dynamics between cross-
border mobility and control at the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border aims to 
demonstrate how regional migration management discourses and practices are 
negotiated, adopted and challenged at national and local levels.   
In March 2010 the General Immigration and Alien Law No. 8764 (Ley General de 
Migración y Extranjería) came into force in Costa Rica.19 It replaces the former law 
No. 7033 from 1986. The bill for the novel legislation has been discussed over the 
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 http://www.rcmvs.org/documentos/investigacion/visas.htm (15/01/11). 
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 Actually the new law constitutes a reform of a version of the law No. 8764 which already was 
adopted in 2006 but not brought into force due to resistance of the government at that time.  
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past ten years. The result is a completely new legal-institutional framework for the 
regional migration management paradigm dominated by the migration-security-
nexus: the design is heavily influenced by the legislative model of the Palermo 
Protocols, the Puebla Process’s action plan scheme, and IOM participated actively 
as a consulting agency in the development of the bill.20 Hence, similar to almost all 
Puebla Process member states, the new Costa Rican migration legislation contains 
two of legal precepts against human smuggling and trafficking that the former law did 
not exhibit. This concerns firstly the criminal offence of tráfico ilícito de personas 
(human smuggling) which is defined as follows:  
“ y jail sentence from two to six years will be punished [anyone] who leads or 
transports persons in order to facilitate their entry into the country or their exit from it 
by crossing sites not authorised by the migration agency, and thus evading the 
migration inspections, or who uses falsified or expired data or documents. The same 
penalty rules for those who promote, promise or facilitate the receipt of such 
documents aiming at promoting the unauthorised transport of migrants, the lodging, 
obscuring or hiding of aliens who enter or stay illegally in the country” (Ley No. 8764, 
título 15, artículo 249). 
As an effect the term tráfico ilícito de personas is increasingly replacing the popular 
word coyotaje in Costa Rica. Within the Central American context ‘coyote’ is an 
umbrella term that denotes the most diverse types of intermediary service providers 
including those facilitating irregular migration, and coyotaje indicates a wide range of 
practices related to the enabling of unauthorised or semi-legal border-crossings. 
These vary from lodging and feeding irregular migrants, the bribery of border 
authorities and immigration officers, the local cross-border transport of persons by 
passing them through the border’s blind spots, to more transnationally organised 
forms of migrant smuggling across several borders, countries and even continents.  
As a report of the Tabasco Human Rights Committee (Codehutab) from 2005 points 
out, that within the Mexican and Central American popular imaginary the coyote 
figure does not necessarily carry negative or criminal connotations since it presents 
a sort of bridge to an imagined better life elsewhere or a promoter of cross-border 
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 See interview to the coordinator of the IOM’s regional office’ unit against human smuggling and 
trafficking in San José (13/05/2010).   
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activities. Hence, the image as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ coyote depends on how the 
individual coyotes treat their ‘clients’, i.e., if and how the contract negotiated between 
the coyote and the migrant is fulfilled, and whether the coyote abuses the vulnerable 
situation of irregular border-crossers or not. However, the redefinition of coyotaje as 
tráfico ilícito de personas as fixed in the new migration law and the criminalising 
discourses related to it opens the possibility to state authorities to prosecute and 
punish the whole range of migration facilitating actors and practices outlined above.  
A penal code reform in 2009 included the offence of trata de personas (human 
trafficking) which was also largely defined according to the Palermo Protocols.21 The 
definition of víctima de trata de personas (victim of human trafficking) in contrast 
forms part of the new migration law as well. This migratory status is a special and 
temporary one. A person considered a trafficking victim enjoys certain rights and 
must not be expelled or deported while “regularising those migrants’ situations that, 
due to their nature, require attending to differently than other categories of migrants” 
(Ley No. 8764, título 6, capítulo 4, artículos 93 and 94). According to the novel 
migration legislation the category of victim constitutes the only legal status irregular 
migrants can obtain without being expelled, deported or punished. While victim 
status ensures certain social and protective rights, these rights are limited until the 
moment the migrant’s situation has been ‘regularised’. With regard to the 
victimisation of migrants, this status is comparable to political refugee status. 
According to the new law, ‘political refugee’ constitutes another legal status for 
migrants, though without temporal delimitations.  
The new migration law is not only influenced by international actors and discourses 
but also by national interests and not just with regard to the regulation of 
immigration. Indeed, the new law can be analysed as part of new forms of domestic 
government that emphasise security-focused policies. The law for instance 
envisages the expansion of the national migration agency’s sphere of influence. 
Previously, the competences of immigration officers were limited to migration related 
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or irregular adoption” (Código Penal de Costa Rica, artículo 172). 
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administrative issues. The new law, in contrast, permits them to conduct proper 
judicial investigations “in the area of migration against corruption and transnational 
organised crime” as well as “against the criminal offences of smuggling and 
trafficking” (Ley No. 8764, título 4, artículo 18  2 y 26). Previously, only the Organism 
of Costa Rica for Judicial Investigations (OIJ) was authorised to carry out such 
investigations.  
Control and escape at the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border  
As mentioned above, regional migration management discourses constitute the 
Central American borders as problem zones of government and, indeed, the state 
borders of the Isthmus countries can be seen as very permeable transition zones 
(Bernecker 2005: 33). The border as a line of demarcation and thus a marker of 
territorial sovereignty has little historical significance. In contrast, local societies 
developed in the border regions with their own cross-border practices, forms of 
social organisation, and economic relations. The borders themselves hardly played a 
role in the shaping of this societal space. Jacques Ancel refered to this phenomenon 
as “border societies” (1938: 182f). The border which separates Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, the so-called northern border, is a particularly lucid case in this regard. 
Only two authorised border posts exist along the 300 kilometre long border: these 
are Peñas Blancas which is a land post, located in the province of Guanacaste, and 
Los Chiles in the Alajuela province where the border has to be crossed by a river 
(see Map 1). However, the border reveals countless blind spots, for instance at least 
seven rural roads or tracks. Furthermore, until the Nicaraguan Sandinista Revolution 
in 1979, neither the Costa Rican nor the Nicaraguan state had even tried to establish 
any form of control in these parts of their national territories.22  
Hence, to date the daily routine of living and surviving in border districts like Upala 
and La Cruz, the latter including Peñas Blancas, is marked by border crossings in 
both directions, most of them unauthorised. The population that lives along the 
border between Peñas Blancas and Upala or in the rural communities on the 
Nicaraguan side of the border uses a wide range of blind spots and forms of 
transport in order to cross the line. The reasons for crossing the border range from 
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Granados (1997). 
24 
 
working, trading or farming, to visiting family members or obtaining social services. 
This is especially the case in the district of Upala and its neighbouring Nicaraguan 
communities – places that do not have any border post in the immediate vicinity. In 
addition, transit migrants from South America and other continents heading to the 
north, as well as people from all parts of Nicaragua who seek to work or live in Costa 
Rica, frequently cross the border clandestinely. 
Map 1 The Costa Rica-Nicaragua Border Region 
 
In order to outline the emergent new border regime in the north of Costa Rica, I 
emphasize in this concluding section the main actors and practices of border 
management that target the border as a site of innovative technologies of 
government (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010: 986). Additionally, I focus on 
representative actors and practices that challenge these interventions.  
Traders, border communities and seasonal workers 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua show enormous differences regarding production costs, 
incomes and sales prices. For instance, the informal trade of Nicaraguan products 
constitutes an attractive commercial activity for people who live on the Costa Rican 
side of the border region. In particular the border town Upala is a typical market 
place for Nicaraguan commodities. Here the Riveras23, who hail from the Isla 
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Ometepe in Nicaragua and came to Upala about 17 years ago, operate a small shop 
selling shoes and clothing located in the centre of the town. Mrs. Rivera buys the 
merchandise, via Nicaraguan intermediates, from manufacturers in the Nicaraguan 
town of Masaya. She travels to Nicaragua at least six times a year to negotiate 
conditions and prices with the Masayan manufacturers and the intermediaries. The 
Riveras hold Nicaraguan citizenship but possess Costa Rican resident identity cards. 
However, they do not possess passports since a passport is expensive and implies 
extensive bureaucratic procedures. While the Costa Rican resident identity card 
enables a person to legally exit the country, a valid passport is required for legal re-
entry at one of the two border posts.  
Mrs. Rivera deals with this situation through a combination of legal and illegal 
strategies to maintain her commercial cross-border activities: she uses her resident 
identity card to exit the country legally via the border post of Peñas Blancas, without 
any costs or risks. The return from Nicaragua to Costa Rica is achieved 
clandestinely, by passing a blind spot located close to the Costa Rican border town 
of Santa Cecilia where a rural road leads her back to Upala. The costs and risks of 
this clandestine border-crossing are higher than the legal border crossing: Mrs. 
Rivera has to count on a potential monetary bribery (mordida) ranging between two 
and five U.S.-Dollars to the police officers who show up from time to time at the blind 
spot she regularly uses. She also runs the risk of being requested by these 
authorities to pay with so called “sexual favors” (Interview Mrs. Rivera, Upala, 
27/04/2010).  
A few kilometres away from Upala two rural communities are located between the 
Nicaraguan side of the border and the shore of the Lake Nicaragua. In administrative 
terms these communities belong to the Nicaraguan province of San Carlos. 
However, they do not have any direct access to a road and, thus, it takes residents 
at least a whole day to reach a Nicaraguan town that provides basic social services. 
But, in contrast, the communities are well connected to Upala by a gravel road that 
crosses the border at a blind spot close to a small border village called Mexico. The 
communities’ residents frequently use this road, and thereby cross the border 
undocumented to travel to Upala to obtain basic social services such as health care 
or schooling (notes of field trip 29/06/10; www.canal2.com.nica, 14/01/11).   
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Rural seasonal workers from Nicaragua form another important group of border 
actors. Especially during harvest times at the large orange, sugar cane and 
pineapple plantations, which have been expanding on both sides of the border over 
the past 15 years, thousands of workers from all parts of Nicaragua irregularly cross 
the border. These border crossings are realised with or without support from coyotes 
at many different blind spots between Peñas Blancas and Los Chiles. Within this 
context it is worth mentioning that in many cases the irregular border-crossings of 
rural workers are organised by the fruit companies themselves, which contract 
coyotes in order to bring in cheap labour from Nicaragua.24  
Transit migrants 
Extra-regional transit migrants heading north, in turn, prefer to cross the border at 
the formal border post of Peñas Blancas, or close by, since this post is located on 
the Pan-American Highway that connects North, Central and South America. This 
constitutes a crucial fact for long distance migrations that need to move quickly. One 
day in April 2010, I observed the detention of six people – probably from Somalia – 
at the border post of Peñas Blancas. According to the police officer who detained the 
migrants, the group had entered the country two weeks before by crossing the 
border post of Paso Canoas on Costa Rica’s southern border with Panama. When, 
as the officer pointed out, the group was unable to show valid passports they turned 
themselves in to the border authorities and requested political asylum. The migrants 
were then transported to the country’s capital San José in order to proceed with their 
requests. However, a few days after their arrival in San José, they disappeared and 
reappeared shortly after in Peñas Blancas where they tried to cross into Nicaragua 
by using a small track that runs parallel to the inspection facilities. In doing so, they 
attempted to evade document inspection. Once detained, the six migrants were 
supposed to be returned to San José (interview with police officer, Peñas Blancas, 
24/04/2010). According to another police officer stationed at the border post of Paso 
Canoas, transit migrants, especially those from East African countries, increasingly 
request political asylum from the border authorities, a category for legal immigration 
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which was not abolished by the new migration law (interview with police officer, Paso 
Canoas, 26/07/2010). 
This occurs against the backdrop of new visa requirements for non-residents 
introduced by the Costa Rican government in 2003 tt had adopted new visa rules for 
non-residents, thus restricting the ability of citizens from most of the countries of the 
global South to enter the country easily as tourists. The new visa rules, for instance, 
make applying for a consular visa, which is only valid for 30 days, a condition of 
entry for Nicaraguan and Colombian citizens. The rules for citizens of most African 
and Asian states, as well as of Eastern Europe countries that are not members of the 
European Union are even more restrictive. Citizens from these countries have to 
solicit in advance a so called restricted visa from the Director General of Migration in 
Costa Rica.25  
Drivers 
Drivers constitute another crucial group of border actors since the practices of 
undocumented or  partially-documented, cross-border mobility outlined above are 
realised through several forms of transport. Counted among the most important 
forms are buses and registered taxis as well as informal or pirate taxis (taxis piratas). 
Especially in Upala a considerable number of pirate taxi drivers survive by 
transporting persons to and across the borders’ blind spots.  
Border authorities and coyotes 
The detention of the Somali migrants at Peñas Blancas constitutes an unusual case. 
In general the whole range of irregular border crossing practices previously outlined 
can be realised not only with thanks to countless blind spots but also to informal 
agreements with the border authorities. These agreements are based on tolerance 
or bribes such as money or “sexual favors” even at the Peñas  lancas’ border post. 
This implies that border authorities like the police, customs and immigration officers 
also constitute important promoters of undocumented border-crossings. 
Furthermore, several groups of local coyotes run a sort of ‘office’ within the billiard 
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28 
 
saloon of ‘Pedro’s  ar’ located in front of the customs facilities on the Costa Rican 
side of the Peñas Blancas border post. This fact is at least tolerated by the 
authorities and it is more than probable that they even cooperate with the coyotes 
(see also Villalobos et al. 2008). 
At the same time the border authorities count among the most important domestic 
migration and border management actors. All of the more than 20 Costa Rican police 
and migration officers I conducted interviews with mobilised the Anti-Trafficking 
discourse when it came to the question of irregular border crossings. For instance, 
during the conversations I had with the police officer who detained the Somalis, he 
repeatedly stressed his assumption that the Africans were certainly not politically 
persecuted in their country but were probably trafficking victims. However, this 
assumption could not be confirmed by any observable evidence (interview police 
officer, Peñas Blancas, 24/04/2010). Furthermore, the border authorities I 
interviewed frequently intermixed human trafficking with discourses on drugs and 
arms. Thus, they presented the border as a problem zone of government: their 
narratives centred on the image of the border as a bodega, a store and reloading 
point, dominated by alien criminal syndicates from Mexico and Colombia, as well as 
by the chaotic circulation of unauthorised commodities and smuggled or trafficked 
humans. The deputy director of the national police force in the Costa Rican northern 
region when was asked to point out the major challenges to the border authorities, 
summed up these representations as follows: “the northern border shows three 
problems: trafficking of arms, drugs and humans” (interview with Deputy Director of 
the National Police Force, Liberia, 09/04/2010).  
These discourses materialise as reinforced police presence and control posts 
throughout the border region, less along the border itself but rather along the 
principal routes that lead to it. According to the same informant, over the past ten 
years these pre-frontier control strategies have been extending up to 100 kilometers 
into the country’s territory. Furthermore, the new control posts are operated by a 
combination of different police units including the national police force, counter-drug, 
and migration officers (interview with Deputy Director of the National Police Force, 
Liberia, 09/04/2010).  
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Intergovernmental and civil society organisations 
As previously outlined, migration and border management does not only entail top-
down strategies of control but also emerges as a kind of social control for mobile 
populations. In this regard the most important border actors in Costa Rica are 
intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and the Catholic Church. For the past five 
years the IOM, UNHCR and UNICEF, for instance, have established local offices at 
the border region and have been conducting capacity-building activities and 
workshops in cooperation with religious organisations, municipalities, local NGOs, 
police departments and migration agencies. Many of these programmes target police 
and immigration officers as well as NGO representatives in order to sensitise them to 
the human rights of migrants and to indications that a person could either be a 
human smuggler/trafficker or a smuggling/trafficking victim.26 One of the interviewed 
Upala immigration officers, for instance, had already attended several capacity-
building workshops and claimed to have  learnt to be more aware of “alien” or 
“suspicious” persons who circulate in the border region and to treat “familiar”, local 
border crossers more respectfully. He highlighted, for example, that in the case of 
Nicaraguan seasonal workers and residents of the Nicaraguan border communities 
the immigration officers now tended to refrain from controlling documents (interview 
with immigration officer, Upala, 29/06/2010).  
The Catholic Church, in turn, not only participates in capacity-building activities but 
also provides social and religious services to mobile populations, especially to 
Nicaraguan border communities, seasonal workers, and other irregular migrants who 
pass through the Costa Rican border towns. The Catholic parishes of Upala and Los 
Chiles, for instance, run so-called casas de migrantes (migrant shelters) where 
irregular migrants can obtain free lodging and food for a limited number of days. 
According to the new migration law the shelters operate within a grey area between 
charity and human smuggling.27 Thus, the priests who manage the facilities draw 
                                                          
26
 This information is based on interviews with representatives of NGOs, municipalities, and the 
Catholic Church as well as immigration and police officers in Liberia, Upala, La Cruz, and Los Chiles. 
These interviews were carried out between April and July 2010.  
27
 However, the shelter in Upala is supported by the IOM, while the one in Los Chiles is funded by a 
cross-border fruit company because it constitutes a cheap and safe form of housing for seasonal 
workers.  
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heavily on an Anti-Trafficking discourse in order to place their projects within the 
realm of humanitarian aid and to distance themselves from smuggling.28 The shelters 
indeed provide a refuge from control and prosecution since the police cannot enter 
the facilities. But the shelters’ rules have a tendency to the social control of migrants’ 
bodies and to divide them into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants. Women and men are 
spatially separated and sexual relations as well as the consumption of alcohol and 
other drugs is forbidden. According to interviews with shelter staff in Los Chiles 
(28/06/10) and Upala (27/04/10), people who appear drunk, drugged or in another 
way “suspicious” cannot be admitted. Furthermore, all residents have to leave during 
day time working hours. 
Selective criminalization and graded zones of tolerance 
The ethnographic analysis of border actors and practices reveals that territorially 
based border control and a repressive approach to irregular migration are neither 
feasible nor envisaged at the Costa Rican northern border. Migration and border 
management activities tend to establish a new governmentality of border 
permeability, as well as of the tracking of movements and bodies throughout the 
border region. The Anti-Trafficking discourse thereby works as a leading narrative in 
order to reorganise the field of irregular migration by creating ‘suspicious’ and 
‘familiar’ border crossers, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ border actors as well as ‘tolerable’ and 
‘intolerable’ practices of cross-border mobility. The combination of decentralised top-
down as well as social control strategies results in what I call ‘selective 
criminalisation of irregular border crossers’ and converts the border region into 
‘graded zones of tolerance’. These concepts indicate that certain actors, movements 
and practices of irregular cross-border mobility are tolerated while others are 
criminalised. Tolerance, for instance, is given to students from the Nicaraguan 
border communities who cross the border’s blind spots in order to attend the school 
in Upala. The same counts for Nicaraguan seasonal workers as long as they do not 
appear drunk, drugged or in any other way deviant. This tolerance is spatially limited 
however: without the required documents, it is much more difficult for either group to 
pass through the pre-frontier controls, leave the border zone and move towards the 
                                                          
28
 See interviews with the priests of Liberia (23/04/10), Upala (27/04/10), and Los Chiles (28/06/10). 
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Central Valley of Costa Rica. Mobile individuals, in contrast, like irregular transit 
migrants who seem ‘suspicious’ or ‘alien’ to police and migration officers or to 
religious and civil society organisations, might easily be associated with smuggling or 
trafficking and thus criminalised or victimised and subjected to inspections, 
detentions or questionings. Hence, in contrast to the Nicaraguan students and 
seasonal workers these groups face problems entering the border zone and passing 
the pre-frontier controls heading from the Central Valley to the border. Furthermore, 
the new criminal offence of tráfico ilícito de migrantes, defined by the new migration 
law, includes the transport of persons who do not carry the required documents to 
enter or exit the country. Thus drivers, especially the pirate taxi drivers, are 
subjected to prosecution and penalisation either if stopped at one of the pre-frontier 
border posts and  found to be transporting people who lack the appropriate 
documents or if the taxi is attempting to cross the border at a blind spot. 
Strategies of escape 
The Costa Rican border regime, however, is also marked by strategies of escape 
from control, even though these are rather ambiguous and hybrid. Among the 
escape strategies are bribing the border authorities and the combination of legal and 
illegal border crossings, both having been demonstrated by the case of Mrs. Rivera. 
Another escape strategy consists in duping the authorities, as attempted by the 
Somali transit migrants. The only remaining legal status an irregular migrant may 
obtain in Costa Rica without being expelled or rejected is to be considered a victim of 
trafficking or of political persecution. In effect, the Somali transit migrants 
appropriated victim status and transformed it into a strategy of moving forward 
through Costa Rica on their way to the north. But it is, of course, the coyotaje which 
constitutes the most premeditated strategy of escape.  
The idea of autonomy of migration conceptualises tricking and coyotaje as dissident 
strategies in opposition to actors and strategies of control. The migration 
management paradigm, in turn, produces a binary discursive distinction between the 
state authorities on the one hand and the law breaking migrant or the extra-legal, 
criminal human smuggler or trafficker on the other. The local context of the Costa 
Rican border society, however, shows how both constructs dissolve. At the Peñas 
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Blancas border post, for instance, the figure of the border authority and the figure of 
the coyote merge together. Another hybrid social phenomenon is that of the migrant 
shelters. These facilities indeed support escape from state control by providing 
refuge, lodging and nourishment. But their rules for admittance result in new forms of 
social control on migrants’ bodies. These are informed by Catholic norms and 
values. Thus, neither autonomy of migration nor a clear distinction between actors of 
control and of escape can deliver an appropriate framework to analyse the local 
border regime in the north of Costa Rica. However, migration, cross border mobility 
and border societies can be analysed as powerful social forces that constrain the 
institutional arrangements of a border regime to adopt flexible strategies of control.  
Conclusions 
In this paper I have analysed manifestations of, as well as contestations to, the 
migration management paradigm in North and Central America. I started with several 
assumptions. First, I argued that migration management in this region is not about 
erecting a ‘Fortress America’, but rather about establishing social control on mobile 
populations. Second, in order to understand the logics of regional migration 
management, intergovernmental organisations and the understudied Central 
American Isthmus countries, especially Costa Rica, needed to be more 
systematically included into the analysis. Furthermore, the Isthmus countries had to  
be perceived both as dependent peripheral or global South countries and as 
independent nation-state actors with proper interests. Third, I argued that the 
migration management paradigm is being challenged by the power of migration and 
cross-border mobility. I claimed that this is especially the case at the very permeable 
Central American borders, which can be considered critical junctures of migration 
management. Therefore, I deemed it crucial to pay special empirical attention to 
Costa Rica and its northern border. The analysis of the Costa Rican border society 
shows, in contrast to the assumption of autonomy of migration, that these 
contestations are not necessarily opposite or dissident to control.  
Thus, in order to answer the questions of how migration management materialises at 
the regional, national and local levels and how this paradigm is being contested I 
developed a multi-level and multi-actor framework of analysis. I drew upon studies 
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on neoliberal governmentality, international government and the dynamic concept of 
ethnographic regime analysis. This framework enabled me to emphasise on the one 
hand the institutional arrangements of the migration management paradigm such as 
the Puebla Process, the new migration law in Costa Rica and actors of migration and 
border control at the Costa Rican northern border, and on the other hand, the 
strategies of escape from control that could be identified within the local context of 
Costa Rican border society.  
I demonstrated that the migration management paradigm shapes the characteristics 
of a new regional mobility regime in North and Central America as well as a new 
national migration regime in Costa Rica and a local border regime at the Costa Rican 
northern frontier. The institutional arrangements of these regimes are marked by the 
criminalisation of irregular migration that links undocumented cross-border 
movements to organised crime, especially to human smuggling and trafficking. This 
Anti-Trafficking discourse works as a leading narrative in order to reorganise the 
migration field at the regional, national and local levels. In general the reformulation 
of irregular migration in terms of organised crime and the related victimhood 
approach fuels, according to Geiger and Pécoud (2010:13), the “confusion between 
humanitarian, development and security agendas, while also reinforcing the 
depolitisation of migration and migration policies”. Counter-trafficking efforts, which 
ostensibly aim to protect the human rights of irregular migrants, are unlikely to be 
questioned by anyone. Thus, they create consensus between governmental and 
intergovernmental actors as well as between metropolitan states (most of them 
migrant-receiving countries) and global South countries (most of them sending or 
transit countries). But, at the same time, the human rights discourse of the Anti-
Trafficking paradigm seems to have replaced any policy regarding binding 
commitments or international agreements on migrants’ rights.  
Furthermore, as the analysis of the Puebla Process shows, regional consultative 
processes on migration can be seen as arenas where the Anti-Trafficking paradigm 
forms an important part of innovations in the “ways in which metropolitan states 
govern the countries of the global South” (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010: 990). 
Hence, by defining human smuggling and trafficking as a common threat the 
institutional arrangement of the Puebla Process indeed constitutes North and Central 
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America as a single region. The “borderland” countries (Duffield 2001) of the Isthmus 
sub-region, however, seem to participate only as deficient, ‘learning’ partners of 
western norms and standards especially with regard to the management of irregular 
migration and borders. 
Costa Rica, at first glance, is no exception in this regard. However, this state is not 
only a peripheral global South or borderland country marked by emigration and 
transit migration but also the most powerful actor in the Isthmus sub-region, and an 
important destination of immigration, particularly from impoverished Nicaragua. 
Furthermore, the most diverse forms of local cross-border mobility can be observed 
within the Costa Rican northern border region. Hence, in the national Costa Rican 
context the criminalisation of irregular border-crossings and counter-trafficking efforts 
respond not only to post-imperial logics of international government but also to 
national interests. These consist in re-regulating and restricting legal immigration, 
especially from Nicaragua. Moreover, the transformation of the domestic migration 
and border regime can be seen as part of broader state transformation processes 
that tend to govern social inequalities through security-focused policies.   
The analysis of the Costa Rican local border regime in turn shows that its 
institutional arrangement assures circulation in order flexibly to steer the movements 
and bodies of mobile populations. Here the Anti-Trafficking discourse materialises 
both as pre-frontier top-down control and as social control strategies. These work as 
selective criminalisation of irregular border crossers and produce graded zones of 
tolerance. The result is, among other things, a potential illegalisation of the local 
border society. But this historically constituted local society is formed by a wide 
range of actors: traders, agricultural workers, drivers, students, coyotes and, last not 
least, border authorities. These actors often tolerate each others’ illegal cross-border 
practices and they live, survive or enrich with these practices. Thus, the concept of 
autonomy of migration, which constructs the border crosser as opposite to border 
control, cannot capture the social dynamics of border society. However, the border 
society continues to be a powerful social challenge to the migration management 
paradigm.   
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 Deputy Director, Migration Agency, Upala, Costa Rica (29/06/10). 
 Deputy Director, National Police Force, Liberia, Costa Rica (09/04/2010). 
 Director Regional Office IOM, San José, Costa Rica (15/06/10). 
 Migration Officer, Upala, Costa Rica (29/06/10). 
 Mrs. Rivera, Trader, Upala, Costa Rica (27/04/10). 
 Police Officer, Peñas Blancas, Costa Rica (24/04/10). 
 Police Officer, Paso Canoas, Costa Rica (27/07/10). 
 
 
